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I – INTRODUCTION
This volume suggests a drastically different concept of a “constitution” 
from that with which we are familiar: a constitution, it shows us, should no 
longer be seen as a monistic normative phenomenon of higher legal rules, 
but rather as a dualistic normative arrangement, one that connects otherwise 
epistemically incompatible processes, i.e., the development of constitutional 
forms and the history of constitutional ideas. This conceptualization destroys 
the traditional unity of the constitution – be it the political unity of Carl 
Schmitt or its legal unity à la Hans Kelsen – and dissolves constitutionalism 
into the tension-ridden duality of two diverse and often contradictory 
autonomous evolutionary processes.
As described in this volume’s introduction, this duality explains the 
differences between the great historical models of constitutionalism – the 
American legalist-structural model, the French revolutionary-political 
model, and the English historicist-social model: each of which represents 
a different historical configuration of these two interrelated processes. 
Moreover, it shows how the three constitutional pathologies – juridification, 
oversocialization, and mutual indifference – emerge out of an imbalance in 
the interaction between constitutional form and constitutional ideas.
In this chapter, I will explore a third consequence of such a 
conceptualization: that the conceptual move from constitutional monism 
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to constitutional dualism reveals a specific evolutionary dynamics in 
constitutions – i.e. a “spontaneous” process which produces unforeseen 
results against the founders’ intentions. My thesis is that there is not one 
uniform evolutionary process through which a constitution reacts to 
environmental pressures. Rather, constitutions develop via two distinct 
evolutionary trajectories – one of constitutional form and the other of 
constitutional ideas. And, moreover, these two trajectories are connected by 
the dynamics of co-evolution.
My thesis comprises of three arguments. First, I reformulate the 
interrelation between constitutional ideas and constitutional structures in 
terms of a double reflexivity of social discourses and legal rules. Second, I 
show how this double reflexivity occurs under the umbrella of what we can 
call a “hybrid constitutional meta-code”. Third, I demonstrate how a variety 
of co-evolutionary mechanisms link these two trajectories, and are thereby 
responsible for a variety of constitutional arrangements. I will develop these 
three arguments not only in the context of state constitutions, but also in the 
context of various non-state constitutions, drawing especially on what I will 
call economic constitutions.
II – FIRST ARGUMENT: THE DOUBLE REFLEXIVITY OF SOCIAL DISCOURSE AND LEGAL RULES
Even if lawyers do not like to admit it, legal rules do not play the 
principal role in the workings of a constitution – any constitution, be it a 
state constitution, an economic constitution, or some other form of social 
system. Rather, constitutionalization is primarily founded on a self-reflexive 
set of ideas that give meaning to some autonomous set of social practices, 
be it politics, the economy, or in some other social sphere. Because of 
its autonomy, we will refer to this as a “self-constitutionalization”. As we 
shall see, legal structures do play an indispensable role in the process of 
constitutionalization, but it is more of a supporting role.
A self-constitution, in the first step, is constructed out of the “double 
closure” – in the sense described by Heinz von Foerster – of some set of 
social operations. These operations generate first-order closure by linking a 
set of self-produced social operations with one another and thereby setting 
it set apart from its larger environment. This set can then then develop a 
second-order closure by subjecting these social operations reflexively to a 
second generate first-order closure by linking a set of self-produced social 
operations with one another and thereby setting it set apart from its larger 
environment. This set can then then develop a second-order closure by 
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subjecting these social operations reflexively to a second set of operations 
that tests for validity.
Thus, for example, political constitution acquires its autonomy when 
it first generates decisionmaking practices involving a closed community 
of decision-makers, and then generates a double closure by subjecting 
these practices to a second-order set of autonomous legitimating operations 
– such as elections, consensus from a diversity of independent power 
bases (e.g., federalism, separation of powers, or a bureaucratic ordering 
of diverse specializations), and social and / or judicial understandings of 
the demands of fundamental rights. The economic constitution acquires 
its autonomy when, within the money cycle, payment operations are used 
not only to effect transactions, but also to control the money supply that 
makes payment operations possible. In the same way, science acquires its 
autonomy only when it subjects its first-order operations – i.e., empirical 
observations and formulaic constructs – to second-order operations of 
epistemology, methodology and theory of science that determine whether or 
not some particular formulaic observation belongs to the system of science. 
Such double closure allows a particular social sector to define its external 
boundaries and thereby establish an internal identity that distinguishes it 
and its operations from the other social operations that constitute the larger 
social sphere. It is in this way that these primordial self-constituting processes 
become autonomous in the strict sense.
Moreover, the status of double-closure requires that relationship 
between these two sets of operations be “reflexive”. This refers to a 
condition in which radical changes in one of these orders of operations will 
induce sympathetic evolutions in the other – i.e., radical changes in social 
operations can induce changes in validity operations, and vice versa.
Without reflexivity, the two sets of operations will de-couple, and lose 
their coherence as a system.
Along these lines, the epistemic constitutional construct that this 
volume calls “ideas” – i.e. a medial reflexivity of some association of 
constitutional practices together with associated cognitive and normative 
reflections on the identity generated by these practices – represent one kind 
of doubly-closed system. At the first level, a system of constitutional ideas 
give meaning to some particular set of constitutional practices; at the second 
level, it tests for the validity of these meanings by subjecting them to a test 
for mutual coherence. Im this way, it serves to self-constitute a particular 
socio-epistemic system.
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By itself, however, it is not sufficient to generate a “constitution” in the 
strict or technical sense. We should only speak of “constitutions” in the strict 
sense when a self-constituted socio-epistemic system of “ideas” is supported 
by another, complementary, self-constitutionalizing process – that of the 
structural-positive system of law.
More precisely, true constitutionalization occurs when a doubly- 
-closed, self-constitutionalized socio-epistemic system of “ideas” – be it in 
politics, the economy, or some other sector – becomes structurally coupled 
with a second kind of doubly-closed, self-constitutionalized system, that of a 
“legal system” – i.e., what this volume refers to as “form”. Like the epistemic 
social system of ideas, constitutional form is also a reflexive social system, 
consisting of both primary legal norms that provide first-order closure, and 
second-order legal norms that provide second-order closure by establishing 
the validity of these first-order norms. These higher-order legal norms in 
particular are critical to the constitutionalization process: the application 
of primary legal norms to a social sphere leads merely to that sphere’s 
juridification (i.e., Kant’s Rechtsstaat), not to its constitutionalization. The 
situation only really becomes constitutionalized when norms of norms – that 
is, secondary norms – prescribe how the identification, setting, amendment 
and regulation of competences for the issuing and delegating of primary 
norms are to occur.
In order to generate a constitutional system, however, the structural 
coupling of ideas and legal form must itself be reflexive, in the sense that 
radial changes in the system of ideas cause sympathetic changes in the 
legal system, and vice versa. As mentioned above, this such reflexivity is 
necessary to secure the constitution’s systemic coherence. But since both 
ideas and form are themselves reflexive system, this results in a double 
reflexivity – and it is this double reflexivity that is distinctly characteristic of 
constitutionalism.
In other words, the precondition for a constitution in the strict sense is 
that a structural coupling takes place between the reflexive mechanisms of 
legal structures (that is, secondary legal norm creation in which norms are 
applied to norms) and the reflexive mechanisms of ideas that give meaning 
to those legal structures. This occurs when self-constitutionalizing socio-
epistemic processes that render some particular environment of societal 
rationalities legal norm creation in which norms are applied to norms) and 
the reflexive mechanisms of ideas that give meaning to those legal structures. 
This occurs when self-constitutionalizing socio-epistemic processes that 
render some particular environment of societal rationalities both meaningful 
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and autonomous are themselves juridified by a separate set of self- 
-constitutionalized legal processes. Only in this way can the developmental 
dynamic typical of constitutions, as described by the introductory chapter, 
emerge – in the form of an institutionalized co-evolution between these two 
self-reflexive processes (as we shall explore further in Part IV of this chapter).
It is in this distinctive, double reflexivity of constitutionalism that we 
encounter its curious duality – a duality that is characteristic of a strict structural 
coupling and that refutes the widespread presumption that a constitution is 
a unitary phenomenon. The two extremes of this duality, associated with 
the names of Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, need to enter into a mutual 
embrace in both political constitutions and social constitutions. In this sense, 
a constitution can be reduced neither to a legal structure (á la Kelsen) nor 
to a socio-political practice (à la Schmitt). It is always a dual phenomenon: 
a linking of these two innately autonomous processes. From the legal 
perspective, constitutionalization involves the production of secondary legal 
norms that are peculiarly interwoven with the fundamental understandings 
of the social system. From the social perspective, constitutionalization 
involves the production of secondary epistemic norms that are themselves 
critically informed by the legal norms recognized by the system. Only when 
both these conditions operate together does it make sense, in terms of both 
legal sociology and legal doctrine, to speak of the “elements” of a political 
constitution, of an economic constitution, of a constitution of the education 
and science system, or of the digital constitution of the Internet.
What is the reason, though, for this doubling of social reflexivity 
through the use of secondary legal-constitutional norms? Law comes into the 
self-constitutionalization processes of social systems when autonomization 
cannot be fully accomplished using just the first and second order social 
operations of those social systems. This might occur, for example, when 
these social operations are unable to stabilize themselves, or when they 
become indeterminate due to their own internal paradoxes. In such cases, 
additional closure mechanisms are needed to complete the self-constitution 
of social autonomy.
The law is one of these additional mechanisms (albeit not the only 
one). Consider, along these lines, the self-description of the autonomous 
“state”. As noted by Niklas Luhmann, “[t]he political system is only 
differentiable at all when it describes itself as a state.” But the closure of 
institutionalized politics is not accomplished without formal delineations of 
what constitutes collectively-binding state power. The reflexive application 
of first order power dynamics (command) to second order power processes 
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(oversight) cannot be exposed to the constant fluctuations of power itself. 
A higher order to legal norms is needed to bring stability to the reflexive 
interactions that structure acquiring and exercising power. In this sense, it 
is only through the structural coupling of politics to law that the political 
system become autonomous in the form of “the state”.
More important still is the contribution made by the law to defusing 
the paradoxes of political power. As also described in Chapter [Loughlin] 
to this volume, traditionally the paralyzing paradox of the self-binding 
nature of “the sovereign” has been normalized – but not resolved – by 
the establishment of “rule of law”. Similarly, the self-constitution of social 
systems necessarily comes up against its own paradoxes relating to its self-
reference – e.g., the paradox of the legitimacy of its own founding – and 
one way of dealing with this paradox is to externalize “the founding” to the 
law. This is what happens in state constitutions, but it can also be observed 
in the self-constitutions other social systems. Thus the autonomy of a social 
constitution is never autonomy in pure form: it always contains elements 
of heteronomy. The “self” of the self-constitution must first be defined 
heteronomously, through legal norms. This is necessary in order to be able 
to identify itself as an autonomous system.
These additional mechanisms of self-constitution vary quite markedly 
from one social system to another. Science requires only minimal support 
from stabilizing legal norms to achieve autonomy. Methodologically, the 
epistemology of science is itself generally capable of hammering in the 
boundary stakes that mark out the realm of science on its own, especially 
since science is not subject to any decision-making imperative. Despite all 
the worrying about corruption in the academic world, it seems superfluous 
to attach a binding self-description to science as a collective qua scientific 
community, or even for the scientific community to be since science is 
not subject to any decision-making imperative. Despite all the worrying 
about corruption in the academic world, it seems superfluous to attach a 
binding self-description to science as a collective qua scientific community, 
or even for the scientific community to be incorporated into some formal 
organization in order to secure the scientific credentials of knowledge. Legal 
systems therefore play a relatively small role in the constitutionalization of 
scientific activity – although even here, an heteronomous stabilization is still 
needed in order to provide guarantees of scientific freedom and to secure 
the persistence of scientific institutions, the latter being then left to their own 
self-constitutions.
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The economy, by contrast, requires a huge amount of heteronomous 
stabilization from the law for its self-constitution (albeit still not to the same 
extent as politics). As is well known, the institutions of property, contract, 
competition, and currency form the cornerstones of the economic constitution. 
All of these institutions are constructed out of secondary legal norms that 
legitimate and validate the practices associated with these institutions. 
These secondary norms are essential for allowing a double reflexivity to 
operate within the economic system: a reflexivity in which primarily norms 
of economic transactions (e.g., exchange) are subject to secondary norms 
of economic legitimation (e.g., norms of market expectations), that are 
themselves critically coupled with corresponding primary and secondary 
norms articulated in the legal system, such as conscionability and good faith, 
that give needed persistence to these norms of legitimation and expectation. 
(See also discussion in Part IV.)
III – SECOND ARGUMENT: HYBRID BINARY META-CODING
To some extent, the argument above recapitulates the argument 
presented by Martin Loughlin in his chapter XX. But here I want to go further, 
and show that double reflexivity by itself is not enough. The end point of 
constitutionalization – be it in politics, in the economy, or in other social 
spheres – is not achieved until the reflexive relationship between social 
ideas and legal structures has developed in such a way that a hybrid binary 
meta-coding emerges. This coding is “binary” in the sense that it recognizes 
only two possible encoded states – “constitutional/unconstitutional” – in the 
situations to which it is applied. It is “meta” in the sense that it only operates 
on decisions that have already been encoded as “legal/illegal” by the self- 
-constituted legal system that is part of the constitutional system.
This produces the distinctive hierarchy that is typical of all constitutions: 
that is, that of a “constitutional” law – i.e., “the law of laws” – operating 
above the ordinary law.
But what is really special about this meta-coding is its “hybridity”. This 
constitutional code takes precedence not only over the legal system, but also 
over the binary codes of the other specialized “function-systems” – such as 
the economic system, the political system, even the health system when 
access to health care is a state right – that in toto constitute the constitutional 
order. As it does with regards to law, this meta-coding exposes the operations 
of these other function-systems to a higher-level binary reflexivity as to 
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whether or not they are or are not behaving in accordance with their larger 
responsibilities to the constitutional order.
The hybrid nature of this meta-coding can be observed most clearly 
in the developed political constitutions of the modern nation states. Here, 
the “constitutional/unconstitutional” distinction is used as a meta-code that 
applies to two similarly binary-coded subsystems – namely those of law and 
politics (see, e.g., “juridical constitutions” vs. “political constitutions”) – but 
without causing these subsystems to lose their autonomy from one another. 
It allows the constitution to be a neutral process of structural coupling: a 
way of integrating the two social subsystems of politics and law without 
causing either to lose its autonomy. Similar hybrid meta-codings also crop 
up – usually implicitly, occasionally explicitly – in the structural couplings 
of law with other social systems, producing their own constitutional meta- 
-codes.
For example, the constitution of the modern industrial economy 
has its own kind of hybrid meta-code that provides a seemingly common 
formula for two quite different types of economic operations. This meta- 
-code assumes hierarchical precedence over both legal and economic binary 
codings related to the economy, but it actually takes on different meanings 
depending on whether it is applied to the economic code or the legal code. 
Applied to the economic code, it subjects exchange procedures to reflexive 
evaluation in light of their overall social function, and identifies their social 
and environmental compatibility. Applied to depending on whether it is 
applied to the economic code or the legal code. Applied to the economic 
code, it subjects exchange procedures to reflexive evaluation in light of 
their overall social function, and identifies their social and environmental 
compatibility. Applied to the legal code, it sits hierarchically over ordinary 
law, judging legal acts according to whether or not they are in line with the 
high values and principles set down in the economic constitution.
Thus, while the economic-constitutional meta-code presents itself 
formally as a simple unitary distinction directrice of “constitutional/
unconstitutional”, what we really have before us here is an interesting special 
case of “essentially contested concepts” – a case where the same term is 
interpreted in very different ways in different contexts and is implemented in 
correspondingly different connecting operations. This Janus-faced character 
of the constitutional meta-code has to do with the fact that by itself, the 
economic constitution, as itself a structural coupling between two mutually 
closed social systems (the economic system and the legal system), is 
unable on its own to attain social-systemic autonomy. Rather than merging 
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together into a single system, both the economic and legal systems remain 
attached to their own independent operational domains – namely, that of 
market transactions and that of legality respectively. The “constitutional/
unconstitutional” operation provides a common umbrella formula that 
nevertheless takes on different meanings depending on whether it applies to 
the economic system, where it expresses market validity, or the legal system, 
where it expresses legal validity.
The duel nature of the economic-constitutional code necessarily 
means that, within its domain, legal “structures” and economic “ideas” 
develop their own programs for that constitution – programs that are 
normatively independent from each other, but still interrelated (perhaps 
homeostatically, as Dowdle elsewhere proposes). Each of these programs 
emerges initially from the reflexive and recursive application of the system’s 
own primary and secondary operations. Yet, their common meta-coding in 
terms of “constitutional/unconstitutional” causes constant mutual irritation 
that binds both systems into a co-evolutionary relationship. The fact that in 
law, the meta-code “constitutional/unconstitutional” is given hierarchical 
precedence over the legal system’s coding of “legal/illegal” not only allows 
basic principles of the economic system to be injected into the principles 
of the legal system, but also allows both these sets of principles (legal and 
economic) to co-evolve in response to evolutions their respective social 
systems.
This is where we find the real justification for a truly material concept 
of constitutionalism, as contrasted against the formal and the functional 
concepts of constitutionalism. Constitutionalized law cannot be reduced 
simply to compliance with certain decision-making processes (forms), but 
demands substantive justification by means of content-based constitutional 
principles (ideas). Such law would not be constitutionally comprehensible 
without the re-entry of the basic material principles of these two self- 
-constituted social system into the constitution’s legal system. In the context of 
the economic constitution, for example, this binding of constitutional law to 
specific economic ideas is certainly not prescribed by natural law. Rather, it is 
the result of historically changing processes of reflexivity in which the social 
self-constitution of the economic system is constantly being reconstructed in 
law as an ensemble of content-based, constitutional-legal norms. Something 
comparable also occurs in the opposite direction. Constitutional meta- 
-coding causes the law to become reconstructed in economic terms, such 
as the law of contract being reconstructed as a particular operationalization 
of economic transactions; property as a particular operationalization of 
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social relationships; competition law as a particular operationalization of 
economic efficiency; and company law as a particular operationalization of 
collective economic “rationality”.
The reciprocal re-entry of the material principles of economy and law 
into the economic constitution thus gives rise to two different “imaginary 
spaces” within that constitution: two different constitutional programs – 
one aimed at the economy, the other aimed at the law. These programs are 
directed, jointly but separately, by their shared constitutional meta-code. 
The resulting dualization of that meta-code’s meaning becomes especially 
clear in relation to one of the classic programs of the economic constitution, 
namely property. In economic terms, property describes the “disjunction of 
the requirement for consensus” that governs socio-economic coordination. 
In legal terms, property refers to an exclusive subjective right. The economic 
constitution uses both concepts according to context. It thereby takes the 
form of a language game in which there is a peculiar double structure to its 
common distinction directrice of “constitutional/unconstitutional”. But as a 
exclusive subjective right. The economic constitution uses both concepts 
according to context. It thereby takes the form of a language game in which 
there is a peculiar double structure to its common distinction directrice 
of “constitutional/unconstitutional”. But as a language game, it does not 
develop the strength to become an autonomous, self-reflexive “language” 
in its own right. Rather, it forms a peculiar “binding institution” in which 
the law and the economy are closely coupled, and thereby mutually irritate 
one another. In doing so, it produces a bilingualism in that it continually 
translates law into economics and vice versa.
IV – THIRD ARGUMENT: CHANNELS OF CO-EVOLUTION
Constitutional history shows itself to be co-evolutionary. Under the 
umbrella of their “constitutional/unconstitutional” meta-coding, political 
constitutions “develop” via a co- evolutionary process that links the 
development of their political programs (i.e., their self- constitutionalizing 
systems of constitutional ideas) and the development of their legal programs 
(i.e., self-constitutionalizing systems legal forms and structures). Societal 
constitutions co-evolve by linking their social programs with their legal 
programs. And both the political and the social constitutions co-evolve due 
to the hybrid capacities of this constitutional meta-coding.
Contrary to a unified social evolution in which constitutional evolution 
comes about simply from external environmental pressure operating 
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on various social systems, each self- constitutionalizing system with the 
constitutional system has own very specific and very distinct evolutionary 
mechanisms. Each system – legal, economic, social – displays different 
patterns of variation, selection, and retention. Their autonomous evolutionary 
processes influence each other via mechanisms of co-evolution. This is 
the opposite of the usual assumption in constitutional history of a unified 
evolutional trajectory that is driven purely by forces of economic, moral, 
or political natural selection. Rather, it involves diverging evolutionary 
trajectories taking place simultaneously within a single constitutional 
system. To use the terminology of the first chapter to this volume, the 
“structure” of constitutional law at the one side and the “ideas” of the focal 
social sector (e.g., economy, politics, science, education) on the other all 
operate according to their own idiosyncratic and independent evolutionary 
mechanisms, while the coevolutionary process of the constitution system as 
a whole coordinates these evolutionary dynamics so as maintain sectorial 
autonomy and identity.
If one wishes to understand the particularities of any single constitution, 
one must therefore look not merely at the individual evolutionary paths of 
its respective sectoral social systems, but also more specifically at how their 
mutual channels of reciprocal influence have developed within and through 
this process of co-evolution.
Consider, for example, the two different kinds of economic 
constitutions identified by the varieties of capitalism literature, those of 
liberal market economies and those of coordinated market economies. 
Economic constitutions have always been shaped by specific legal, political, 
scientific, and educational developments in their region. This is the first 
source of their differences: they display cultural particularities that can only 
be explained by reference to the special histories of their various constituent, 
self-constitutionalized sub- systems. The other source of their differences, 
that which interests us now, is to be found in the specific co-evolutionary 
interactions between their legal and the economic subsystems.
These interactions can be arranged along to two dimensions. One 
dimension concerns the quality of the co-evolutionary influences, the other 
concerns the density of their co- evolutionary co-ordination.
As regards the quality of their co-evolutionary influence, the 
interactions between constitution’s subordinate social systems can involve:
•	 Irritation: in which external stimuli originating from one social 
system excite internal evolutionary selection processes in the 
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other system, but do not direct these processes to any particular 
procedural or substantive ends;
•	 Simulation: in which external stimuli originating from one 
subordinate social system cause the selections mechanisms of 
the other social system to reproduce (via mimesis) the selection 
mechanism of the stimulating system, without necessarily 
reproducing the selection results of the stimulating system; and / or
•	 (via	mimesis) the selection mechanism of the stimulating system, 
without necessarily reproducing the selection results of the 
stimulating system; and / or
•	 Endogenous symbiosis: in which external stimuli originating in 
one social system cause the other system to incorporate into 
its own stabilization mechanisms the results of the stimulating 
system’s selection processes.
As regards the density of co-evolutionary coordination, co-evolutionary 
interactions can be classified as follows:
•	 spontaneous vs. organized: the degree to which the interactions 
are the product of or subject to human intentionality;
•	 simultaneous vs. sequential: whether the mutually co- 
-evolutionary dynamics occur at the same time;
•	 fragmented vs. integrated: the degree to which the evolutionary 
changes are systemtically harmonized;
•	 antagonistic vs. coordinated: whether the co- evolution takes the 
form of positive or negative feedback loops.
Drawing from the comparative experience of judicial review of 
standard form contracts in the United States and Germany, I will sketch 
how the different economic constitutions of these two countries – the liberal 
market economy of the United States vs. the coordinated market economy of 
Germany – are products of different co-evolutionary channels.
In private law, judicial review of standard contracts in the economic 
constitutions is the functional equivalent of constitutional review of political 
legislation in state constitutions.
Standard contracts are not voluntary agreements by two contracting 
parties, but rather market-regulatory mechanisms that are unilaterally 
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imposed on the market by private economic organizations. When courts 
review standard contracts under the somewhat old- fashioned private-law 
principles of good faith (as is the case in Germany) or unconscionability 
(as in the United States), they are engaged in the same general activity 
as are constitutional courts when reviewing legislative acts according to 
constitutional principles.
Traditional comparative law sees judicial review of standard contracts 
in these two countries in terms of similarities, convergences, and/or 
possibilities for legal harmonization. Traditional economics sees it in terms of 
pressures of natural selection driven by competitive dynamics of economic 
efficiency. The approach developed here, by contrast, identifies the drastic 
differences in the legal rules of these two regimes, as well as differences in 
their respective institutional advantages and disadvantages, and traces these 
differences back to the different mechanisms of constitutional co-evolution 
particular to their respective constitutional systems.
From a traditional perspective, the two regimes’ treatment of standard 
contracts seems highly convergent. The formal similarities of what we might 
call “economic constitutional review” in the two countries are indeed 
astounding. Standard contracts are subject in both the USA and in Germany 
to judicial review via very similar sets of economic-constitutional concepts, 
policies, and principles. Both regimes have recognized standard contracts 
as being legally enforceable despite their somewhat asymmetric character. 
Both make the validity of these contracts dependent on certain conditions 
(good faith, fairness, unconscionability) that clearly differentiate them from 
ordinary contracts.
Similarities between these two regimes can also be found with regards 
to the quality of their respective co-evolutionary influences. Both regimes 
favor leaving the development of the new forms of contracts to the whims of 
coincidental irritations: economic innovations in standard-form contractual 
practices irritate the legal system via introducing new kinds of cases into 
the court system that produce new, idiosyncratic forms of legal evaluation; 
while new legal doctrines affect changes in the forms of the standardized 
contracts. At the same time, however, both systems also evince parallel 
manifestations of both simulation and standard-form contractual practices 
irritate the legal system via introducing new kinds of cases into the court 
system that produce new, idiosyncratic forms of legal evaluation; while new 
legal doctrines affect changes in the forms of the standardized contracts. At 
the same time, however, both systems also evince parallel manifestations of 
both simulation and endogenous symbiosis. In both countries, the principles 
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of judicial review internally reproduce selection criteria used in economic 
evaluations of these kinds of contracts (simulation). Both also occasionally 
assimilate the results of economic evaluations establishing the validity of 
standard contracts into their own findings of legal validity, even without 
reproducing the selection processes internally (endogenous symbiosis).
But divergences become apparent when one begins to scrutinize 
the different weights that each constitutional regime gives to processes of 
simulation vs. processes of endogenous symbiosis. In The United States, 
legal-economic co-evolution place primarily through endogenous symbiosis. 
In German practice, it is driven much more by simulation.
This is because in the United States, standard-contracts forms are 
developed independently by individual firms. This decentralized mode of 
private governance leads to a plethora of standard-contract types. So great 
is this individuated diversity that it transcends the informational capacity of 
the reviewing courts. Courts are therefore forced to defer to the evaluative 
results produced by the economic system, and autonomous judicial control 
of standard contracts is relatively underdeveloped.
In Germany, by contrast, it is not the individual firm, but sectorial 
business associations that formulate standard contract regimes. Thus, in 
principle, each industrial sector has a standardized standard-contract form 
that is used by all the firms in that sector. This results in much reduced 
variation in standard-contract forms. Moreover, these contractual regimes are 
frequently scrutinized by public authorities – in particular the Federal Cartel 
Office, or Bundeskartellamt. As a result, German courts have a relatively 
good overview of the standard-contract characteristics in each sector. In 
contrast to the US, this allows for autonomous and highly detailed judicial 
review of standard contract regimes, in which German courts incorporate 
into their own selection mechanisms autonomous legal principles that 
reproduce the manner in which the economic subsystem pertinent to the 
relevant industrial sector distributes risks and imparts transparency. The 
distinct political and legal factors that underlie their particular formulations 
in turn frees the courts from having to symbiotically defer to the outcomes of 
economic selection processes that themselves remain external to the legal 
system.
And divergence between these two regimes becomes even more 
apparent when we consider the respective densities of their co-evolutionary 
contacts. In the United States, as we saw, individual firms implement 
their own contractual regimes, often with the other side of the transaction 
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replying with its own firm-specific standard contract, and it is market 
competition that decides which one prevails. It is, in this sense, spontaneous. 
American courts, which as has already been noted exercise relatively weak 
constitutional control over standard contracts, also react post hoc when 
unacceptable risks have materialized. In this way, the American regime also 
manifests itself sequentially. It is also highly fragmented: in deciding issues 
raised by standard contracts, courts do so not by applying uniform standards 
of contract law, but by examining for highly context-specific incidents of 
tort-like misconduct rather than for more generalizable problems of the 
distribution of risks inherent in the standard contract form itself, as per 
contract law. Such fragmentation is further catalyzed by the intervention of 
numerous autonomous state and federal agencies and autonomous state and 
national legislative frameworks.
In sum, in the United States, the density of co-evolutionary 
coordination between the legal and the economic subsystems of the 
economic constitution insofar as standard contracts are concerned is 
spontaneous, fragmented, and sequential. There is a plethora of standard- 
-contractual regimes, and judicial intervention on constitutional grounds is 
markedly limited. This is in direct contrast to the density of co-evolutionary 
coordination in Germany, which is organized (rather than spontaneous) and 
integrated (rather than fragmented). It is integrated (rather than fragmented) 
in the sense that – as we have seen – standard contracts are formulated by 
sectorial business associations rather than by individual firms. It is organized 
in that the formulation of such contracts is specifically designed (especially 
by the Bundeskartellamt) to strike a balance between a variety of social 
concerns – not simply those of a particular firm or industrial sector. These 
include, for example those of the class of actors that are most likely to be 
on the other side of that standard contract; those of classes of likely-affected 
third parties (especially as concerns distribution of liability for risk and 
Bundeskartellamt) to strike a balance between a variety of social concerns 
– not simply those of a particular firm or industrial sector. These include, 
for example those of the class of actors that are most likely to be on the 
other side of that standard contract; those of classes of likely-affected third 
parties (especially as concerns distribution of liability for risk and insurance); 
and those of various political, administrative, and supervisory bodies (and in 
particular the Bundeskartellamt itself).
Consequently, in contrast to American courts, German courts do 
heavily intervene in the construction of the standard contract regulatory 
regime. This is incomprehensible from an economic standpoint, which 
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regards such heavy intervention as just another case of “Eurosclerosis”. 
From that standpoint, such intervention seems inefficient and paternalistic. 
It is paternalistic in that it not only imposes protections on consumers 
without their consent, it also second-guesses professional market judgment 
regarding the correct assignment of risk. It is inefficient in that it discourages 
the development of new and more efficient contract formulations.
But such heavy judicial intervention nevertheless does make sense 
from a constitutional standpoint, and in particular from the constitutional 
perspective which derives from Germany’s specific variety of capitalism – 
its coordinated market economy as distinguished from the American liberal 
market economy. From that perspective, the criterion for judicial intervention 
is whether or not the contractual form under review represents an authentic 
innovation – i.e., an innovation that increases the productivity of the 
industry – or simply a spurious innovation – i.e. an innovation that simply 
transfers exposure to risk to the other party without promoting productivity. 
The policy principle for such review is not just to protect medium-sized 
companies, but to promote productivity enhancing co-operation between 
firms by protecting the autonomy of and facilitating co-operation among all 
the stakeholders affected by the contractual transaction.
V – CONCLUSION
In this chapter the interrelation between constitutional structures and 
constitutional ideas has been reformulated in terms of a double reflexivity of 
social discourses and legal rules. Double reflexivity means the precondition 
for a constitution is that a structural coupling takes place between the 
reflexive mechanisms of legal structures (that is, secondary legal norm 
creation in which norms are applied to norms) and the reflexivity of ideas in 
the social sector related to it. This applies to political constitutions as well 
as to various non-state constitutions, especially to economic constitutions. 
This interrelation occurs under the umbrella of a “hybrid constitutional 
meta-code”. It has been demonstrated how a variety of co- evolutionary 
mechanisms link these two trajectories which makes them responsible for a 
variety of constitutional arrangements.
